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Abstract
David Lewis once stated that if we want to know what meanings are, we need to find out what
meanings  do.   Upon  examining  what  the  Old  English  se  paradigm  is  doing,  one  will  see  that
definiteness, as it is defined in Modern English, does not exist in that language, inviting the question:
how did definiteness arise?  Scholars have identified the overlap in function between demonstratives
and definites as being a crucial part of the story, but few have tried to analyze the change with formal
tools.  The informational uniqueness theory of definites in English (Roberts 2002, 2003) formalizes the
overlap in function via a shared presupposition.  I argue that the se paradigm in Old English is much
like the Modern English demonstrative  that,  but with a few added functions.   I then show that  by
treating the OE demonstrative as requiring a uniqueness presupposition similar to that  of  its  MnE
counterpart, the development of definiteness can be outlined in terms invited inferencing (Traugott and
Dasher 2005).  This account provides pragmatic motivation for the change, rather than suggesting that
it is part of a deterministic grammaticalization process.
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Introduction
The semantic details of the English definite article have been debated in the literature for some
time.  Typically these investigations are synchronic, with little attention paid to the form's ancestor, the
Old  English  demonstrative  se.   It  follows  from observations  made  by  Greenberg  and  others  that
definites tend to develop from demonstratives; however, the exact nature of this tendency cannot be
explained  without  clear  definitions  of  definiteness  and demonstrativity.   The semantics  of  the OE
demonstrative are often taken for granted; students of the language may learn that it "does duty for 'the'
and 'that'..." (Mitchell and Robinson 1982, 105), yet where one might expect it, it is likely to be absent.
In this paper I use some of the tools of formal semantics to uncover details about the meaning of se and
argue  that  by  comparing  these  details  to  those  of  the  Modern  English  article  the,  one  can  find
motivation for the demonstrative > definite change.
The following section is a review of the literature on definiteness and demonstratives in Modern
English.   Section 2 reviews  the  semantic  change and grammaticalization literature,  Section 3 is  a
synchronic analysis of the OE demonstrative, and Section 4 outlines how invited inferencing explains
the evolution of the form.  The conclusion summarizes and discusses some difficulties which arise in
doing these sorts of analyses.
1 What is Definiteness?
Before  an  adequate  diachronic  analysis  can  be  achieved,  we must  thoroughly  examine  the
synchronic facts.  There is some disagreement about the semantics of definite NPs in MnE, but in this
paper I will show that by using Roberts' theory of informational uniqueness (2002, 2003) as a working
account for definite descriptions, the development of the definite article from the OE demonstrative
reflects not only a cross-linguistic tendency, as shown by Greenberg (1978), but an intuitively natural
semantic extension which conforms nicely to an existing model of semantic change.  In this section I
briefly discuss the history of the definiteness debate.
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1.1 Russellian Uniqueness
Russell  (1905) proposed that  definite descriptions  entail  existence  and uniqueness.   By this
account, a proposition containing a definite NP is true only if that NP has a referent which both  exists
and is unique in the world, and thus, to quote Russell's most famous example, the utterance in (1a) has
(1b) as its truth condition:
(1a) The King of France is bald.
(1b) ∃x [king-of-france(x) & ∀y(king-of-france(y) → y=x) & bald(x)]
The above sentence, according to this hypothesis, is false, since there no longer exists a King of France.
Strawson (1950) took issue with this account, proposing instead that the existence and uniqueness of
the NP were presupposed, not entailed.  
(2) The King of France is bald.  Is the statement I just uttered true or false?
Strawson's justification was that if A were to utter (2) to B, B would be more inclined to explain to A
that there is no King of France than he would to directly answer A's question.  That is, "...the question
of whether the statement was true or false simply didn't arise..." (330).  It is perhaps easier to see that
Russell's uniqueness must be presupposed if we form a question:  Is the King of France bald?  By
forming a question we have left open the truth value of (1a), yet still there must exist a King of France
in order  for  the question to be felicitous.   By asking this  question,  one is  not  inquiring about the
existence and uniqueness of the monarch in question; that is presupposed.
The example in (3), taken from Clark (1975), fails Russellian uniqueness in the strictest sense:
(3) I met a man yesterday.  The man told me a story.
This certainly does not presuppose that there is one and only one man in the world.  Clark proposed
that the felicity of this utterance can be explained by a pragmatic phenomenon he called  bridging,
whereby the speaker draws an implicature about the antecedent of the definite NP.  In (3), the man can
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be taken to mean the man whom I met yesterday.  It is clear from this example that context must play a
role in the use of definites.  For uniqueness to be a plausible theory, these contextual enrichments must
be included in the analysis.  This is what Kadmon (1990) calls liberalization.
Kadmon also shows that Russell's  analysis can be extended to plural  NPs, with the definite
description presupposing maximality rather than uniqueness, illustrated in the following example:
(4a) The Senators from Arizona are bald.
(4b) ∃x [senator-from-Arizona(x) & ∀y(senator-from-Arizona(y) → y∈x) & bald(x)]
Here, x is taken to be a set of individuals denoted by the plural NP, and maximal set membership is
analogous  to  uniqueness.   Note  that  (4a)  and  (5)  will  have  the  same  presuppositions  due  to
liberalization:
(5) (I met both Senators from Arizona.)  The Senators are bald.
Russell's hypothesis and the aforementioned extensions of it can account for many uses of the definite
article in MnE; however, it is too strong a claim, as illustrated in the following example, taken from
Roberts (2002):
(6) Everyone who bought a sage plant or a rosemary planted the sage plant with extra bone-meal or
the rosemary in a well-limed soil, (and if it was a sage plant, bought eight others along with it).
The uniqueness of the sage plant is contradicted by assertion that if a sage plant were purchased, eight
others were purchased along with it.  Yet this is felicitous.  Here it seems the definite NP is referring
anaphorically to  a sage plant, without regard to its uniqueness.  Counterexamples such as these led
Heim (1982) to give a formal account of the  familiarity theory of definiteness, which was originally
proposed by Christophersen (1939).
1.2 Heim's Familiarity
Irene Heim introduced in her 1982 dissertation a model which she calls file-change semantics.
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A file  in  Heim's  terms is  similar  to  Stalnaker's  (1974)  notion of  a  common ground,  which is  the
information that is shared by interlocutors.  A file consists of an ordered pair <Dom, Sat> where Dom
is the domain, a subset of the natural numbers, and Sat is the satisfaction set.  The satisfaction set
consists of the sets of sequences of individuals which satisfy the file.  More intuitively, each number in
Dom represents a card in the file, which is nothing more than an intuitive and metaphoric term for a
discourse referent, introduced by Karttunen (1976), and each sequence in Sat is such that if one were to
assign  each  successive  member  of  that  sequence  to  its  corresponding  file  card  in  the domain,  the
information on the file cards would be consistent with the facts about the individuals.  Heim attempts to
revive the familiarity theory of definiteness using this framework:  "For every indefinite, start a new
card; for every definite, update a suitable old card." (276).  To illustrate, I build a file for the following
discourse:
(7a) I met a businessman today.  He had a dog.
According to Heim's framework, the indefinite NPs a businessman and a dog introduce new file cards.
If we take our domain to be {1,2}, then the file looks something like:
[1 is a businessman, met by speaker] [2 is a dog, owned by 1]
The satisfaction set for this file is the set of sequences of individuals <a(1), a(2)> such that a(1) is a
businessman whom the speaker met, and who owns a dog, and a(2) is a dog which is owned by a(1).
We can then update the discourse with (7b):
(7b) The businessman was taking the dog to the vet.
The file is then updated to look like this:
[1 is a businessman, met by speaker, [2 is a dog, owned by 1,
was taking 2 to the vet] was being taken to the vet by 1]
1.3 Weak Familiarity
The above framework nicely explains discourses such as (6), yet it is obviously not the whole
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story.  Consider the following:
(8) I went to a bar last night.  The bartender was friendly.
(9) (Driving home during a rain storm.)  The rain is sure slowing things down, isn't it?
In both of these discourses, the definite NPs are novel, i.e. there is no prior existing discourse referent.
Rather than being in the common ground, they are entailed by the common ground.  A trip to a bar
entails  an  encounter  with  a  bartender  because  all  bars  have  a  bartender,  and  presumably  the
interlocutors  know  this.   The  existence  of  the  definite  NP  in  (9)  is  entailed  by  the  physical
surroundings.  According to Heim, these sorts of utterances require presupposition accommodation to
be felicitous.  They also require bridging; (8) makes sense only if  the bartender is synonymous with
the bartender who was working at the bar that I went to last night.  This would be easier to deal with if
we incorporated into the theory those discourse referents  which are entailed,  but not given, by the
context.   Roberts (2003) proposes a taxonomy of familiarity which classifies Heim's  familiarity as
strong familiarity, and defines weak familiarity to include strong familiarity as well as those NPs which
are in the common ground but do not have discourse referent antecedents.  Weak familiarity, however,
does not seem to be a sufficient analysis of definite descriptions in English; the definite article is often
used when weak familiarity fails:
(10) I opened the box and pushed the button I found inside.
This is one example where Russell's proposal is appropriate and Heim's is not.  The best account is one
which can reconcile these two approaches.  Although other such attempts have been made, including
Abbot's  (2004) identifiability proposal,  in this paper I  use informational  uniqueness (Roberts 2002,
2003) as my working theory, the details of which are briefly outlined below.
1.4 Informational Uniqueness
  According to the theory of informational uniqueness, definite NPs presuppose existence and
uniqueness, following Russell, but the theory differs from Russell's in that by this account definites
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need not exist uniquely in the world, but rather they must exist uniquely in the common ground.  That
is, for an NP to be informationally unique, it must have a discourse referent antecedent which is weakly
familiar, and furthermore, that discourse referent must be the only suitable discourse referent (under the
NP's description) that exists in the common ground.  Roberts' informal definition is as follows:
Given a context  C, use of a definite description NPi presupposes that there is  a discourse  
referent in the Domain of C which is the unique familiar discourse referent contextually entailed
to satisfy the descriptive content of NPi. (17).
This theory can successfully account for all of the examples given thus far in this paper.  Let's first
examine the more straightforward ones.
(3) I met a man yesterday.  The man told me a story.
(6) Everyone who bought a sage plant or a rosemary planted the sage plant with extra bone-meal or
the rosemary in a well-limed soil, (and if it was a sage plant, bought eight others along with it).
(8) I went to a bar last night.  The bartender was friendly.
(9) (Driving home during a rain storm.)  The rain is sure slowing things down, isn't it?
(10) I opened the box and pushed the button I found inside.
In both (3) and (6), informational uniqueness is satisfied because the NPi is strongly familiar
(familiar in Heim's sense, and thus weakly familiar, since the former entails the latter), and there are no
other strongly familiar discourse referents which satisfy the relevant descriptive content.  In (6), it is
not relevant that the sage plant fails semantic uniqueness, because the indefinite description introduces
a  unique  strongly  familiar  file  card,  to  which  the  definite  description  anaphorically  refers.
Informational uniqueness is also satisfied in examples (8) and (9) because the NPi in each of these
discourses is uniquely weakly familiar.  Notice that (8) is felicitous only if there is one and only one
bartender  who served  you  when you  went  to  the bar.   If  this  condition is  not  met,  informational
uniqueness fails.  Thus, not knowing the facts, the hearer must accommodate the semantic uniqueness
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of the NPi, provided that the hearer is under the assumption that the speaker is being cooperative and
thus trying to be felicitous.  This conversational implicature is responsible for what Roberts calls the
uniqueness effects which arise in definite descriptions.  Heim's framework alone can adequately explain
examples (3), (6), (8), and (9).  The uniqueness implicature is needed to account for (10).  What is
really meant by this sentence is that there is one and only one button that I found inside the box in
question, and I pushed that button.  This meaning arises from the failure of the NPi to satisfy weak
familiarity.  By using a definite rather than an indefinite description, the speaker is expecting the hearer
to accommodate the failed presuppositions of weak familiarity and informational uniqueness; however,
it would be uninformative to expect the hearer to accommodate these directly.   By accommodating
semantic uniqueness instead, which entails weak familiarity and informational uniqueness, the speaker
has conveyed a non-natural meaning (as in Grice 1957) in the form of information about that NPi,
namely that its referent is semantically unique.
This brings us back to Russell's famous example:
(1a) The King of France is bald.
This is infelicitous not simply because uniqueness fails, but because the lack of existence entails that
there can be no discourse referent in the common ground which satisfies the denotation of  King of
France.  The hearer is forced to accommodate, but, since presumably the hearer knows that there is no
such monarch, accommodation is impossible and infelicity results.
The last class of definite descriptions which needs to be analyzed here is titles (Roberts 2003,
22-23).  Chicago is often referred to as The Windy City; Chicago is not unique in being windy (or in
having windbag politicians, if that is indeed the etymology; this should not bear on the semantics of the
definite  article),  and  presumably  interlocutors  will  know  this,  and  thus  there  is  no  way  for
informational uniqueness to be satisfied, and yet we can talk about "The Windy City" with no problem.
This is because the definite article is part of the title, which was presumably coined by one who knew
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of other windy cities, but wanted to distinguish his or hers from all of the others.  Thus, the effect here
is not a uniqueness effect as in (10), but instead a pragmatic phenomenon whereby the definite article is
being used to distinguish one entity from all of the others which share that entity's descriptive content.
In other words, Chicago is not unique in being a city which experiences a great amount of wind, but it
is unique in bearing the title The Windy City.
1.5 Demonstratives
Roberts (2002) proposes that demonstratives and definite descriptions share an informational
uniqueness presupposition.   This account formalizes the intuitive relationship which exists between
these two forms, and accounts for the observation that they are often interchangeable, as in (11):
(11a) My friend has a dog and a cat.  She can’t seem to keep those pets under control.
(11b) My friend has a dog and a cat.  She can’t seem to keep the pets under control.
In  many contexts,  though,  either  the demonstrative or  definite article  is  unavailable.   Consider  the
following sentences:
(12a) My friend visited the Great Wall of China last week.
(12b) #My friend visited that Great Wall of China last week.
(13a) That picture (pointing to picture A) is prettier than that picture (pointing to picture B).
(13b) #The picture (pointing to picture A) is prettier than the picture (pointing to picture B).
While (12a) and (13a) are perfectly ordinary sentences of English, the other two are infelicitous (except
perhaps  in  some  extreme  contexts).   The  demonstrative  in  English  presupposes  informational
uniqueness, but this is not a sufficient statement of its meaning; it must be differentiated from the
definite descriptions to account for the above examples.  Roberts does this by incorporating the notion
of an accompanying demonstration into its meaning:
Given a context C, use of a (non-)proximal demonstrative NPi presupposes (a) that there is an
accompanying demonstration δ whose unique demonstratum, correlated with a weakly familiar
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discourse referent by virtue of being demonstrated, lies in the direction indicated by the speaker
at a (non-)proximal distance to the speaker, and (b) that the weakly familiar discourse referent
for the demonstratum is the unique familiar discourse referent contextually entailed to satisfy
the (possibly liberalized) descriptive content of NPi. (29).
Of course the criteria with which we define a demonstration must be relaxed to include more than
merely physical gestures as in (13).  The felicity of (11a) must also be explainable in these terms.  
Roberts proposes that a demonstration is that which gives “adequate evidence to enable a hearer
to infer the speaker’s intended demonstratum.” (32).  In the case of (13), the pointing gesture allows the
referent to be identified.  In the case of what Lyons (1977) calls textual deixis, which one may view as
a sort of metaphorical extension of deictic usages like in (13), the demonstratum is the antecedent of
the demonstrative adjective itself, as below:
(14) This sentence illustrates textual deixis.
Closely  related  yet  distinct  is  discourse  deixis,  where  the  discourse  referent  of  the  antecedent  is
intended (Roberts 2002, 34).  The use of former and latter is an example of this.  Anaphoric uses as in
(11a) are a special case of discourse deixis.  It is in these cases, which stray far from the gestural use of
the  demonstrative,  where  we  find  overlap  in  function  with  the  definite  article.   Generally,
demonstratives  differentiate;  that  is,  they select  from all  suitable discourse  referents  that  which is
identified by an accompanying demonstration, which can be physical or part of the discourse.  This
function  necessitates  a  uniqueness  presupposition,  because  if  there  were  more  than  one  discourse
referent  which  could  be  intended  by  the  speaker,  the  referent  would  not  be  identifiable  and  the
utterance would be uninformative.  Similarly maximality must be presupposed by plural demonstrative
constructions.
(15) All of the students are doing well in the class, but it is those students who do the extra credit
assignments who learn the most.
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The above example shows a relative clause being used to differentiate one group of students from a
larger one (I call this the contrastive use of the demonstrative).  The utterance must be taken to mean
that all of the students who do the extra credit learn from it.  Note that it is because there is no physical
demonstration, but rather a demonstration in the discourse, that a mere definite description would be
felicitous as well.  It is the goal of this paper to show how such an overlap in function between the
demonstrative and the definite article resulted in the loss of the demonstration requirement of the OE se
paradigm.
2 The Development of Definites
Much  literature  has  been  published  on  the  tendency  of  definites  to  develop  from
demonstratives, though often it is marred by a lack of clear definitions and heavy reliance on intuition.
Before introducing my views, I quote and discuss the significance of some passages of this literature,
and then I review the mechanisms of semantic change and grammaticalization outlined in Hopper and
Traugott (1993) and Traugott and Dasher (2005), which are essential to this paper.
2.1 Definites from Demonstratives
Greenberg  (1978)  proposed  a  three-stage  cycle  of  the  definite  article,  of  which  the
demonstrative, he claims, is stage zero, the starting point from which definites tend to (but need not!)
develop.  This development marks the first stage.  The second stage is what he calls a non-generic
article, which then evolves into a noun-class marker, the final stage of the cycle.  The point along that
timeline which is relevant to this paper is the transition from stage zero to stage one.  It  should be
emphasized that this cycle is probabilistic, not deterministic.  Demonstratives need not undergo any
semantic change, and conversely there are other mechanisms by which it is possible for definiteness to
arise (see Lyons (1999, 331) for examples).   The following quotation best summarizes Greenberg's
view on the development of definites from demonstratives:
The  point  at  which  a  discourse  deictic  becomes  a  definite  article  is  where  it  becomes  
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compulsory and has spread to the point at which it means something "identified" in general,  
thus including typically things known from context, general knowledge, or as with 'the sun' in 
non-scientific discourse, identified because it is the only member of its class.  (31-32).
This is an intuitively sound, and perhaps obvious, description, but Greenberg does not attempt a more
precise account.  This seems to touch on the facts of the phenomenon, but one must ask what it means
to be "identified" (he even indicates the definitional uncertainty by putting identified in quotes).  Recall
the example I opened the box and pushed the button I found inside.  Is the button "identified"?  Clearly
the description must contain more nuances than Greenberg cares to address.
One of  the most  famous  cases  of  a  demonstrative to  definite  shift  is  that  of  the Romance
definite  articles,  which  descend  from the  Latin  demonstrative  ille.   It  is  mentioned  in  passing  in
Greenberg (1978), and one can find a more detailed summary in Lyons (1999, 332-34).  There was
competition between  ille and  ipse 'self',  with the former used cataphorically,  as well as in cases of
textual deixis, and the latter being used anaphorically.  Both exhibited characteristics of the modern
Romance article, but the demonstrative won out, so to speak, presumably because it was less restricted
in its use.  Lyons is led to conclude the following:
The point for the diachrony is that a demonstrative does not immediately become a general  
definite  article;  the  new  article  begins  by  being  restricted  to  the  area  of  overlap  already  
available to the demonstrative, and expands from there. (334).
This statement is empirically well-grounded but the exact nature of the area of overlap and the ways in
which it influences the change are not considered.  Semantic overlap is also touched on by Quirk and
Wrenn in their 1955 A Guide to Old English, who note that, "the problem partly disappears when we
reflect  that  in  many instances  of  their  use  today,  the  and  that are  interchangeable..."  (70).   The
"problem" they are addressing is the one which Mitchell (1985) refers to as "the unreal problem of the
OE  'definite  article'."  (131).   In  other  words,  the  tendency  that  scholars  have  to  draw  the  same
THE OLD ENGLISH DEMONSTRATIVE                                                                                                                                                   12
grammatical distinctions in OE as in MnE is a roadblock to analysis.  Yet Mitchell goes on to address
another problem of analyzing the OE se paradigm:  we have no access to prosodic information; this is
problematic,  Mitchell  speculates,  because  se  the  article  may have  been  differentiated  from  se the
demonstrative  determiner  by lack  of  stress.   Here  it  seems  the  author  is  contradicting  himself  by
referring to the  se  paradigm as if were truly polysemous.  The solution of the "unreal problem", as
Mitchell elsewhere implies, and which I follow, is to treat  the form in question as one entity.   For
simplicity's sake, I call it the OE demonstrative.
I believe it is the case that the above passages rely heavily on the reader's intuition to make the
point for them.  The diachronic literature on definiteness often takes for granted the close relationship
between definites and demonstratives.  This is not trivial; that there exists a cross-linguistic tendency
for this sort of development to occur implies a close semantic relationship and some vehicle which
exploits it, resulting in polysemy.  I follow Roberts' (2002, 2003) proposal that the relationship is that
of a shared informational uniqueness presupposition, and show below that the vehicle for the change in
English was a multi-step process by which invited inferences, as explained in Traugott and Dasher
(2005), rendered the relationship opaque, opening the doors for reanalysis (and later, exaptation).  But
before the details are explained, it is necessary to review the relevant theories of semantic change and
grammaticalization.
2.2 Semantic Change
The quantity of work that has been done in the field of diachronic semantics is minimal when
compared to the rich body of literature devoted to historical phonology and morphology.  The chapter
in Hock's Principles of Historical Linguistics (1991) on semantic change, although more thorough than
some,  is  a  scant  29  pages  in  length,  after  which  it  is  concluded  that  semantic  change  is  largely
unpredictable.  And he's right; yet this conclusion alone does not account for the relative difficulty of
diachronic semantic study.  In fact, all language change is unpredictable.  Sound change is easier to
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study because there is regularity in the Neogrammarian sense, which allows deep comparisons, but one
cannot predict whether a certain change will occur in a given language.  There is, however, the notion
of phonetic naturalness, which is analogous to the presence of the mechanisms outlined in this section
in that  it  can determine the  likelihood of  a  particular  event.   Just  as  unnatural  sound changes  are
possible, semantic changes need not follow an exact path.  Apart from the pragmatic forces which drive
semantic  shifts,  there  are  a  number  of  social  and  other  considerations  which  cannot  be  ignored.
Nonetheless,  the tendencies  that  have been found are cross-linguistic  and motivated,  and thus it  is
desirable to describe changes in terms of these tendencies provided that it is possible and that there is
no evidence to support a contrary hypothesis.
2.3 Invited Inferencing
Traugott's and Dasher's 2005 book Regularity in Semantic Change outlined what is called the
Invited Inferencing Theory of Semantic Change (IITSC) model.  It should be emphasized that, despite
the book's title, this model does not reflect regularity in any Neogrammarian sense, but rather a strong
tendency for certain changes to occur analogous to the prevalence of paradigm leveling or some other
irregular yet frequent process.  True regularity in semantic change is impossible, because there is no
domain which can change across the board the way phonemes do.  That is, the only semantic analog to
phonological features is the facets of a lexeme's meaning, but these facets, which are not grounded in
the physical world, are overlapping and infinite in number, in contrast to articulatory features, which
comprise a closed class.  This is fundamental and perhaps obvious, which may explain the use of the
word regularity without fear of confusion.  Let us now put problematic terminology aside and discuss
the nuts and bolts of this framework.
IITSC is really a theory of polysemy.  It is rare that one meaning shifts to another without an
intermediate, if not persistent, stage where both meanings are available.  That is, pragmatic inferences
often lead to competition between two meanings, which may, but need not, be resolved.  Traugott and
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Dasher illustrate it with variables:  A > A~B (>B) where ">" indicates a possible change and where the
change enclosed in parentheses is less likely to occur.  One example the authors give is MnE since (12),
which is  polysemous with the following change having occurred:   TEMPORAL > TEMPORAL ~
CAUSAL.  That is, the causal meaning of since, as in (16), is innovative and arose from the temporal
meaning, as in (17):
(16) I should be tired, since you woke me up early this morning.
(17) I haven't done anything since you woke me up this morning.
Some polysemies arise by accident.  For example, some speakers may have a polysemy between ear
(of corn) and ear (on your head), though these come from different roots and any semantic relationship
that exists has been imposed by speakers as a result of homonymy (Hock 1991, 282).  Therefore, it
cannot be the case that invited inferencing is the only process by which multiple meanings arise, but
rather that the process is one which has been observed to be the force behind a number of semantic
shifts and so-called grammaticalization phenomena.
The driving force of IITSC is pragmatic.  As the name would suggest, invited inferences are the
building blocks of  this  model.   An invited inference,  not  unlike a  conversational  implicature,  is  a
meaning which is non-natural in the Gricean sense which the speaker invites the hearer to infer.  They
arise through metaphoric and metonymic processes; that is, speakers invite inferences which are either
similar in meaning to or in some way associated with the natural meanings of the utterances which
carry the inferences.  The three-step process by which these non-natural meanings compel change is as
follows:
Step 1: Invited Inference (IIN) not generalized, situation-specific
Step 2: Generalized Invited Inference (GIIN) inference is preferred, but cancellable
Step 3: Coded Meaning second natural meaning becomes available
IITSC is more complex than this,  with  nuances  I  do not address  here;  however,  the basics  of the
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framework should be enough to explain the details of how the definite article arose in English.  The
spirit of the theory is well demonstrated by the following quotation:  "the prime objective of IITSC is to
account for the conventionalizing of pragmatic meanings and their reanalysis as semantic meanings."
(35).  For the sake of clarity, I summarize two examples.
As the first example of invited inferencing at work, consider MnE  as long as  (Traugott and
Dasher 2005, 36-38).  This construction in OE had the meaning of 'for the same length of time that'
(which may have in turn arisen metaphorically from its spatial reading).  The three steps applied to the
construction yielded a second available meaning, 'provided that', as illustrated below.
Step 1: You can stay as long as you need to.  The temporal meaning in this context invites the 
'provided that' meaning as an IIN.
Step 2: She will respect him as long as he respects her.  Here, both meanings are possible, but,
whereas early OE only allowed the temporal reading, the IIN came to be preferred by
speakers of ME; it was generalized.
Step 3: As long as he cuts the grass, I will pay him.  Although the temporal reading persists in 
the lexicon, one cannot get that reading with this example.  This shows that the GIIN has
become encoded into the semantics.
Another example of this process is found in Hopper and Traugott (1993):  the development of the MnE
be going to  construction into a future marker.  Sentences like I am going to visit my mother, though
they may be  read  with  the  compositional  meaning  which predated  the  future  tense  interpretation,
necessarily describe a future event, and thus it is easy to see here how the IIN arose and then was
generalized, eventually becoming a coded meaning of that construction.  The same mechanisms are at
work here, yet this is cited as an example of grammaticalization.  This invites the question:  how does
grammaticalization differ from mere semantic change?  I conclude this section by briefly discussing
this question.
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2.4 Grammaticalization
Meillet  (1912)  was  the  first  to  use  the  term,  which  he  defined  as  the  development  of  an
autonomous  word  ("mot  jadis  autonome")  into  a  grammatical  form.   He  uses  as  an  example  the
development of the Greek future marker tha from thelo ina 'I wish that'.  Grammaticalization has been
defined  in various  ways  since Meillet's  work.   Most  definitions  involve some sort  of reduction in
semantic content, as well as phonological complexity.  Heine and Kuteva (2002) posit four defining
criteria:   desemanticization,  extension  to  new  contexts,  loss  of  morphosyntactic  properties,  and
phonetic reduction.  The be going to example seems to fit the bill:  the construction as a future marker
is arguably less complex semantically, as its content is no longer compositional, certainly the number
of contexts in which we find  be going to  has increased significantly,  it has been reanalyzed as one
syntactic constituent, and it has undergone phonetic reduction as in the form gonna.
It is important to note that the mechanisms by which these grammaticalizations occur are often
identical to those by which other changes occur.  The development of polysemies like the causal since
and the epistemic must seem not to fit as easily into this classification.  Thus we are presented with a
terminological issue:  without a clear definition of grammaticalization, just where do we draw the line?
Joseph (2001) eschews grammaticalization in favor of morphologization, the process by which forms
become a part of the morphology (i.e. lexicon) of a language.  The be going to construction can also be
seen as an example of morphologization, as its change in syntactic behavior and development of a non-
compositional meaning would require that it be incorporated into the lexicon.   Joseph outlines in detail
the development of the Greek future marker tha, and how this is an example of morphologization.  He
notes  that  the  developments  do  not  adhere  to  the  four-stage  "chain  of  grammaticalization"  often
proposed in the literature (Hopper and Traugott 1993, 7, Heine and Kuteva 2002, 4):  lexical form >
grammatical form > clitic > affix.  While the facts of the Greek case study may not conform to any
traditional  definitions of grammaticalization, if  we compare only the initial  and final  stages  of the
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process,  as  Meillet  noted,  the  case  appears  stronger.   That  is,  it  may still  be useful  to  talk  about
grammaticalization as a long term result rather than a process.  This certainly isn't the predominant
view on this subject, but it is useful to view it in these terms.  I return to this concept later, focusing on
how it relates to the demonstrative > definite change in English.
3 The OE Demonstrative
The se paradigm in Old English is that morphological paradigm which is said to correspond to
both  the  and  that in  Modern  English.   It  is  laid  out  in  the table below,  taken from Mitchell  and
Robinson (1982, 15):
(18) Singular Plural
Masc. Neut. Fem. All Genders
Nom. se þæt seo, sio þa
Acc. þone þæt þa þa
Gen. þæs þæs þære þara, þæra
Dat. þæm, þam þæm, þam þære þæm, þam
Inst. þy, þon þy, þon
It was only the nominative masculine form se which evolved into the MnE definite article.  Although
all forms of the paradigm underwent the first stages of the demonstrative>definite change, the non-
nominative and plural forms were lost on the way to MnE, while the neuter þæt ended up as the non-
proximal  demonstrative  that,  and  the  feminine  seo replaced  the  feminine  personal  pronoun  heo,
eventually yielding  she.  The development of this paradigm has implications for grammaticalization
theory because, as I later discuss, in order for the neuter form to have yielded a demonstrative in MnE,
a GIIN must have been lost.  For this reason, I claim that the outcome of þæt is a counterexample to
unidirectionality.
I now turn to a synchronic analysis of the se paradigm in Old English, which I will call the OE
demonstrative.  The reason I refer to it as such, rather than calling it an article, I now outline beginning
THE OLD ENGLISH DEMONSTRATIVE                                                                                                                                                   18
with an  example,  taken  from Ælfric  of  Eynsham's  homily  Nativitas  Domini  (henceforth  N.D.),  as
printed  in  Pope  (1967).   (A  note  on  the  glosses  and  translations:   I  used  Butcher's  (2006)  MnE
translation of  N.D., Chickering's (1977) MnE translation of  Beowulf, and Toller (1898) as guides to
glossing and translating the OE texts used in this paper; however, the glosses and translations are my
own, and I am responsible for any mistakes found therein.)
(19)
In   principio  erat   Verbum,   ET   RELIQUA:    þæt           is   on    Engliscre       spræce,           On 
In     principio        erat      Verbum,         ET      RELIQUA:           which             is     in       English.fem.dat    language.fem.dat,    In 
angynne           wæs     Word,              &       þæt              Word            wæs    mid     Gode,    &            
beginning.neut.dat    was        Word.neut.nom,      and       dem.neut.nom    Word.neut.nom    was        with      God.dat,    and 
þæt             Word            wæs   God.       Ðis   wæs  on  anginne            mid    þam              ælmihtigan 
dem.neut.nom   Word.neut.nom   was      God.nom.     This    was      in    beginning.neut.dat    with      dem.masc.dat     almighty.masc.dat
Gode.   Ealle        þing            syndon   gesceapene  þurh    þæt            Word,           &  butan     þam
God.dat.    All.pl.nom    things.pl.nom    are               shaped              through   dem.neut.acc   Word.neut.acc,  and   without   dem.neut.dat
Worde         nis     geworht  nan þing.   Ðæt            geworht   is   wæs   lif                on   him sylfum,   &
Word.neut.dat    not is    created         nothing.          which                created         is      was      life.neut.nom     in     himself,              and
Þæt               lif              witodlice   wæs   manna      leoht.            And   þæt               leoht           scean 
dem.neut.nom    life.neut.nom    surely             was       man.pl.gen    light.neut.nom     and      dem.neut.nom    light.neut.nom    shone    
on   ðeostrum,        &   þa               ðeostru             ne   underfengon þæt               foresæde             
in      darkness.pl.dat,      and   dem.pl.nom       darkness.pl.nom       not     received             dem.neut.acc       prophesied.neut.acc
leoht.
light.neut.acc
"… 'In the beginning there was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God.'
This existed in the beginning with the Almighty God.  All things are shaped by the Word, and 
without it nothing exists.  That which is created was life in himself, and that life truly was the 
light  of man.  And that  light  shone in the darkness
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prophesied light." (lines 27-36).
We see in this passage that  se is behaving quite differently than the MnE definite article; where one
might expect some form of se to precede NPs like angynne, and Word, whose denotations are unique,
and whose modern counterparts necessitate a definite description, a bare noun is used.  Uniqueness
effects do not arise in this passage as they do in its translation; this is because in MnE, semantically
unique NPs  require a definite article, as to use an indefinite would implicate the possibility of more
than one discourse referent being suitable under the NP's description.  If the encoded meaning of the se
paradigm were the same as that of the article the, this implicature would necessarily arise, and use of a
semantically unique NP without se would not be available.  Furthermore, the form is mostly anaphoric
in this passage, a common usage of the forms we call demonstratives.  Although it differs from MnE
that, the OE form in question is more like a demonstrative than a definite article, and thus I refer to it as
such.  Note that the syntax of the Latin Vulgate passage which is the source for the opening line of (19)
does not appear to have an effect on Ælfric's language; while Verbum, as with Word, is not preceded by
a demonstrative or definite article when it is introduced, no such forms are present in the Vulgate even
when referring anaphorically to Verbum:
(20) In Principio erat Verbum et Verbum erat apud Deum et Deus erat Verbum. (John 1:1).
We can conclude, then, that such uses of the demonstrative are indeed Anglo-Saxon.  Consider also
line 386 of N.D., which is part of the sermon itself, not translated from any Latin source:
(21)
Crist         is    ancenned                  Sunu             of   þam             ælmihtigan       Fæder...
Christ.nom     is     only-begotten.masc.nom     Son.masc.nom     of     dem.masc.dat    almighty.masc.dat    Father.masc.dat...
"Christ is the only-begotten son of the Almighty Father…"
Here  the  NP  ancenned  Sunu is  inarguably  semantically  unique,  and  yet  there  is  no  determiner.
However,  the  demonstrative  form  þam modifies  ælmihtigan  Fæder,  implying  that  uniqueness  is
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somehow associated with the use of se.  I propose that cases like these are instances of demonstratives
being contained within a title, similar to the use of the definite article in "The Windy City".
3.1 Demonstratives in Titles
Note that in (19) all but one of the demonstratives are being used to signify a strongly familiar
discourse referent.  The one exception is þam ælmihtigan Gode, which is a title.  I argue that it is this
status as a title, and not the semantic uniqueness of the NP, which licenses the demonstrative's use.  We
find numerous examples throughout  N.D.,  as in (22),  as  well  as  in other  texts;  Ælfric's  preface  to
Genesis makes reference to "Petrus se apostol", where the use of se is not taken to mean that Peter is
the one and only apostle, but rather it has come to be part of his title.  Even in Beowulf, which is quite
conservative in its use of se, we find in line 92, "cwæð þæt se Ælmihtiga eorðan worhte".
(22)
And   he                him   bead   þa  þreora      daga     fæsten,      &  æfter   þam             fæstene             
and      3sg.masc.nom    3pl.dat   asked   then  three.pl.gen    day.pl.gen fast.neut.acc, and  after       dem.neut.dat      fast.neut.dat 
he                 wearð   swa    afylled   mid   þam               Halgan         Gaste            þæt    he
3sg.masc.nom      became    so           full             with    dem.masc.dat       holy.masc.dat       ghost.masc.dat     that      3sg.masc.nom
ongann  to   writenne  þa             halgan      Cristes    boc            swa swa   we        her   secgað...
began    to     write            dem.fem.acc   holy.fem.acc   Christ.gen   book.fem.acc   as                  1pl.nom   here     say...
"And he asked them for three days of fasting, and after that fast he became so full of the Holy 
Spirit that he began to write the holy gospel that we now discuss…" (N.D. lines 23-26).
Here we have another example of a demonstrative in a title (þam Halgan Gaste), as well as a different
sort of usage in þa halgan Cristes boc.  This NP does not seem to be a title; þa is modifying boc, not
the genitive Cristes.  However, its referent is still differentiated from others that share its descriptive
content  via  the  adjunct  that  follows:   swa swa we  her  secgað.   This  is  reminiscent  of  the  MnE
construction found in example (15).
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(15) All of the students are doing well in the class, but it is those students who do the extra credit
assignments who learn the most.
That is, Ælfric  is  using an adjunct  as a demonstration,  which enables  the hearer  to single out one
referent (the Gospel of John) from multiple possible referents (the four Gospels).  I refer to this use as
the contrastive use.
3.2 Contrastive se
When the demonstrative is used contrastively, it marks that the NP is being differentiated from
other NPs which share its descriptive content via an adjunct or argument.  Note that the differentiating
factor requires that the discourse referent of the NP is informationally unique (or maximal).  Thus, in
these cases,  MnE  the is  a  more natural  translation.   The passage  below shows how a maximality
implication follows from plurality and the contrastive use of the demonstrative:
(23)
Ða       þry             oðre     godspelleras  awriton   heora godspell  be Cristes
dem.pl.nom    three.pl.nom    other.pl.nom  evangelist.pl.nom  wrote         3pl.gen gospel.pl.acc about Christ.gen
menniscnysse, hu  he  to mannum  com,  &  eac be 
humanity.fem.dat,  how  3sg.masc.nom  to man.pl.dat  came,  and also about
þam wundrum þe  he  geworhte on  life.
dem.pl.dat miracle.pl.dat that  3sg.masc.nom  performed in life.neut.dat
"The three other evangelists wrote their gospels about Christ’s humanity, and how he came to 
men, and also about the miracles that he performed in his life." (N.D. lines 17-19).
For purposes of identifiability, þam wundrum þe he geworhte on life must refer to all of the miracles he
performed that were known to the other evangelists.  Below are two more example passages, which
contain a mixture of titles and contrastive demonstratives:
(24)
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Ða   bædon þa             bisceopas   binnan Asian       lande       þone            halgan        Iohannem þæt
then   asked     dem.pl.nom   bishop.pl.nom   within    Asian.pl.gen    land.neut.dat dem.masc.acc    holy.masc.acc   John.acc        that 
he                him   awrite   sume       gewissunge   be      þæs             Hælendes     godcundnysse.
3sg.masc.nom   3pl.dat   write         some           wisdom.fem.sg    about   dem.masc.gen   Savior.masc.gen   divinity.fem.dat
"Then the Bishops in Asia asked The Holy John to write some wisdom about the Savior’s  
divinity." (N.D. lines 20-22)
(25)
Swa    wæs    iu          Pharao,      þe      wann       ongean   God,      se                Egiptisca             
thus       was      formerly     Pharaoh.nom,    who     struggled       against        God.acc,    dem.masc.nom   Egyptian.masc.nom 
cyning,          swa swa   us       cydde   Moyses,   þæt   God           hyne          gewylde   mid       gnættum
king.masc.nom,   as                  3pl.dat     told         Moses.nom,   that     God.nom        3sg.masc.acc   conquered     with          gnat.pl.dat
&    fleogum,   þæt   he                  oft    abæd  are               æt  Gode     þurh     Moyses     þingunge 
and    fly.pl.dat,       that      3sg.masc.nom     often    asked     mercy.fem.acc    at     God.dat     through     Moses.gen   intercession.fem.dat
&    ne  mihte (na   fleo)n   þa            mæðleasan         hundes        lys           þe      him           on       
and    not    could     not   flee          dem.pl.acc     ravenous.masc.gen     dog.masc.gen     lice.pl.acc   which   3sg.masc.dat     in
þone            muð                flugon  ne   þæra        (fleog)ena   meniu              þe      his              mete 
dem.masc.acc    mouth.masc.acc    flew          nor    dem.pl.gen    fly.pl.gen          multitude.fem.acc   which   3sg.masc.gen  meat.masc.acc
besæton,   ne   þæra        gærstapena    þe      gnogon   (his                 wæstmas)...
surrounded,    nor    dem.pl.gen     locust.pl.gen       which    gnaw             3sg.masc.acc        fruit.pl.acc
"And thus was the Pharaoh of old, who fought against God, the Egyptian King, as Moses told 
us, that  God conquered him with gnats and flies, that he often asked mercy from God via  
Moses’ intercession, and could not flee the ravenous dog’s lice that flew into his mouth, nor 
those many flies that surrounded his meat, nor the locusts that ate his fruit…" (N.D. lines 228-
235).
The contrastive use is rarer in Beowulf, but can be found:
(26)
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oðþæt   him            æghwylc    þara ymb-sittendra
until    3sg.masc.dat       each.nom   dem.pl.gen surrounding.pl.gen
ofer hron-rade      hyran  scolde
over whale-road.fem.dat        obey                  must.past
"...until each of the surrounding nations over the whale-road had to obey him..."(lines 9-10).
There are also two examples I found which seem to be contrastive, but in a way that might seem odd to
speakers  of Modern English.   These passages  reflect  a wish to contrast  the NP which follows the
demonstrative  adjective  not  with  other  possible  discourse  referents,  but  rather  with  the  discourse
referent of some other NP in the sentence.  Consider (27) and (28):
(27)
Swa   fela   swa   hine           underfengon, þam    he                forgeaf   anweald       Godes     bearn     
as        many    as        3sg.masc.acc    received,              3pl.dat    3sg.masc.nom    gave            power.masc.acc   God.gen    child.pl.acc   
to   beonne, þam    þe   on    his              naman              gelyfað;         þa þe      na     of       blodum,
to     be,             3pl.dat   who    in     3pl.masc.gen     name.masc.dat           believe;               which           not       of          blood.pl.dat,
ne    of   þæs            flæsces        willan,        ne   of    þæs             weres           willan,         ac       ða þæ 
nor     of     dem.neut.gen   flesh.neut.gen    will.masc.dat,   nor    of    dem.masc.gen    man.masc.gen     will.masc.dat,    but          which 
of    Gode        synd   acennede.
of       God.dat         are          born
"As many as received him, those people he gave the power to be God’s children, those who 
believe in His name, who are not born of blood, neither of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of
man, but rather of God." (N.D. lines 47-50).
(28)
He                 cwæð,   God        sylf       gestod on   þæra         goda        gesamnunge,       &    he          
3sg.masc.nom      said,           God.nom    himself     stood       in      dem.pl.gen     god.pl.gen     synagogue.fem.dat,     and   3sg.masc.nom
on    middeweardan   þa            godas    toscæt…
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in         middle                       dem.pl.acc    god.pl.acc    judged…
"He said, God himself stood in the assembly of the gods and he judged between them…" (N.D. 
lines 21-22).
In (27), the author is contrasting flesh and blood with God.  In (28), a translation of the opening line of
Psalm 82, he is contrasting the mortal gods (the leaders of men) with God (both from Latin  deus).
While  more analysis  is  needed,  I  believe  these are  but  special  cases  of the contrastive use of  the
demonstrative.
3.3 The OE Demonstrative as a Differentiating Device
Taking  gestural  deixis,  which  has  a  biological  basis,  to  be  the  most  basic  use  of  the
demonstrative  (see  Lyons  1977),  we  can  see  how the  uses  outlined  above are  mere  metaphorical
extensions of this meaning; anaphora, title-marking, and contrasting are all ways of achieving that same
goal which is achieved by a physical gesture.  In the simplest of terms, demonstratives differentiate.
Although an exact formal analysis of the OE se paradigm is likely impossible without native speakers'
intuitions  from which to  draw conclusions,  there  is  ample evidence  that  its  use presupposed,  in  a
similar way to MnE, that the discourse referent of its NP was able to be determined by the hearer on the
basis of accompanying information, either linguistic or extralinguistic.  As a result of its broad range of
functions,  the  demonstration  presupposition  became  opaque,  after  which  the  demonstrative  was
reanalyzed as presupposing mere informational uniqueness, which gave way to uniqueness effects.  In
the following section I outline this change in terms of pragmatic inferencing.
4 The Development of Definiteness in English
In  this  section I  propose  a  scenario  whereby definiteness  in  English  arose  from an invited
inference (IIN), examine the sample texts in light of this scenario, briefly comment on the development
of  the MnE demonstrative,  and then revisit  the concept  of  grammaticalization to  determine if  this
account fits into that framework.
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4.1 Definiteness as an Invited Inference
Recall the three steps of IITSC:
Step 1: Invited Inference (IIN) not generalized, situation-specific
Step 2: Generalized Invited Inference (GIIN) inference is preferred, but cancellable
Step 3: Coded Meaning second natural meaning becomes available
Below I apply these steps to the OE demonstrative, demonstrating how definiteness arose from an
invited inference:
(29)
Step 0: The demonstrative, in its canonical deictic usage, presupposes an accompanying 
physical  gesture and the existence of a discourse referent  which can be sufficiently  
identified by the gesture.  Through metaphorization, the requirements of the 
presupposition are relaxed to include textual  deixis, discourse deixis,  anaphora,  and  
contrastive uses.
Step 1: The demonstrative presupposes a discourse referent which is uniquely (or maximally)  
demonstrated  by  an  accompanying  demonstration;  a  demonstration  can  either  be  a  
physical gesture, an antecedent in the discourse, or an adjunct which allows the hearer to
single out the intended discourse referent.  Mere informational uniqueness is not 
sufficient to satisfy the presupposition, and thus uniqueness effects do not arise, 
allowing for bare nouns whose denotations are unique.  In many cases where the 
demonstration is not physical, (as in(23)) uniqueness (and maximality) is necessarily  
satisfied, as otherwise no single demonstratum could be determined, and thus the 
meaning of the demonstrative  could  be analyzed as a mere informational uniqueness  
presupposition, and the utterance would retain its felicity.   The invites the inference  
(IIN) that an NP with a unique weakly familiar discourse referent is marked with 
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the demonstrative.
Step 2: In those cases such as (23), the IIN comes to be the preferred meaning; the IIN becomes 
generalized (GIIN).  The GIIN is involved in the creation of titles (like se ælmightige 
Fæder) for weakly familiar and semantically unique entities, but it is not yet a 
polysemy.  Uniqueness effects still do not arise in NPs which are not titles, and bare  
unique NPs (as in on angynne) are still allowed. 
Step 3: The GIIN becomes an encoded meaning of the demonstrative, giving rise to the 
implicature that all semantically unique NPs must be marked by what can now be called 
the definite article.
Examination of  Beowulf and Ælfric's homilies shows that by the 11th century AD the demonstrative
had undergone Step 2.  I now provide further evidence from these texts in the form of a numerical
analysis.
4.2 Analyzing Beowulf and Nativitas Domini
The manuscripts of both of these texts date to around 1000 AD, but  Beowulf may have been
composed  as  many as  two hundred  years  before  this  time (Chickering  1977,  247,  Butcher  2006).
Because it is older and in the traditional Anglo-Saxon poetic style, it is likely that the epic reflects older
usages of se than Nativitas Domini.  One would expect to find fewer instances of the demonstrative in
Beowulf if it were still at the stage in its development where the canonical deictic usage was most
prevalent.  This is exactly what we find; when comparing Ælfric's homily to a passage of roughly equal
length in  Beowulf we find that the former has more than six times the number of  se forms than the
latter.  The following graphs illustrate the distribution of the various uses of the demonstratives, both in
terms of number of occurrences, and percentage of occurrences:
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Although Beowulf shows a greater percentage of contrastive uses and a reduced percentage of title uses,
it  is  comparable  in  its  distribution  to  N.D.;  the  most  salient  difference  between  the  texts  is  the
tremendous gap in the number of total occurrences.  These numbers show that at the time of Beowulf's
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more conservative in its overall use of that determiner, perhaps suggesting that the non-deictic use of
the demonstrative was still somewhat new.   The definiteness implication is strong, especially in the
works of Ælfric, but it cannot be a coded meaning of the paradigm because of the lack of uniqueness
effects.   At this time,  se had undergone the second step of IITSC semantic change.   This led to a
redeployment of the neuter form þæt to those functions served by the demonstrative before the change
took place.
4.3 Exaptation of þæt
Lass  (1990) introduced the term  exaptation to  describe a  certain  type  of  linguistic  change;
borrowed from biology, the term refers to the development of novel functions for mechanisms.  In the
context  of semantic change,  it  refers to the redeployment  of some grammaticalized form to a new
grammatical  function;  Lass  proposed  this  as  a  counterexample  to  the  unidirectionality  which  is
assumed in much of the grammaticalization literature.  Hopper and Traugott (1993, 138) claim that
such counterexamples "are sporadic and do not pattern in significant ways".   The sporadicity claim,
however, is slightly weakened when one realizes that the demonstrative > definite change in English,
which is often taken for granted to be part of a grammaticalization process (as in Greenberg 1978),
involves such a process.  The semantic development of MnE that is not an exaptation in the same sense
that Lass proposes, as the form had not completely lost its function before it was redeployed (Lass
might  call  it  a  "peripheral  example"  (99));  however,  this  still  may serve  as  a  counterexample  to
unidirectionality in that it involves a partial reversal of the process by which the demonstrative came to
be a definiteness marker.
The details of this change are outlined in Jones' (1988) manuscript  Grammatical Gender in
English.  By his account the neuter form þæt came to serve a novel discourse function.  Jones examines
Northumbrian texts and analyzes  the occurrences  of  "wrong"  gender  assignments,  concluding that,
"unhistorical  'neuter'  forms were  being  used as  discourse  tracking mechanisms  and as  a  means of
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expressing the extent of shared knowledge between reader and writer concerning individual nominal
items." (103).   Interestingly,  most  of the examples  he cites  are straightforward instances  of strong
familiarity.  Consider (30), from the Peterborough Chronicle, cited by Jones (136):
(30)
Crist   ræde   for   þa           wrecce   muneces    of   Burch  &    for   þet             wrecce      stede!
Christ    counsel   for     dem.pl.acc    wretched    monk.pl.acc    of      Burch     and    for    dem.neut.acc    wretched       place.masc.acc
The neuter form þet is modifying the historically masculine stede to mark that it has a strongly familiar
antecedent in the discourse, introduced by  Burch.  Note that the demonstrative can be used in such
contexts in MnE, whereas it is generally not used in titles.  
Jones  cites  examples  from the  gloss  of  the  Lindisfarne  Gospels,  dating  back  to  the  tenth
century, which suggest that by the time of Ælfric's West Saxon writings speakers of the Northumbrian
dialect  had begun to use gender as a way of differentiating uses of the demonstrative.   One might
predict then that the neuter form would come to be associated less with contrastives and titles as gender
is lost in English, and the GIIN would be lost; this is, of course, consistent with the MnE outcome,
where the descendant  of  þæt is  not  a marker  of mere informational  uniqueness.   Thus, I  insert  an
intermediate step into the account seen in (29):
Step 2.5: After the redeployment of the neuter form to uses which are closer to the canonical use 
of the demonstrative, its GIIN is lost, exempting þæt from the third step.
Of course, this is but one part of a larger story, which includes the redeployment of the femine seo as a
3SG feminine pronoun and the loss of case.  More importantly, however, this account shows that there
was actually  a reversal  in a  process  by which a so-called grammaticalization was unfolding.   The
contradicts the hypothesis that semantic change is unidirectional.
4.4 Grammaticalization Revisited
Recall  the four  characteristics  of  grammaticalization outlined  in  Heine  and Kuteva  (2002):
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desemanticization,  extension  to  new  contexts,  loss  of  morphosyntactic  properties,  and  phonetic
reduction.  Now let's examine the demonstrative > definite transition with respect to these four criteria.
The  forms  did  not  undergo  significant  phonetic  reduction;  a  change  from  [s]  to  [θ]  affected  the
masculine form, and the neuter form remained nearly identical in its shape.  One could view MnE the
as a reduced form, inasmuch as it is often pronounced with a schwa, but the same cannot be said for
that.  The morphosyntactic properties have been reduced only in that grammatical gender and case have
been lost in English, and thus the paradigm has collapsed; however, this is a complex development and
surely not solely the result of any heuristic which may have driven the change in the demonstrative.
The OE demonstrative was in fact extended into new contexts, but after the exaptation of the neuter
form, if we look at either one of the resulting determiners individually, the range of contexts is actually
more limited than before the exaptation occurred.   Finally,  the desemanticization question does not
necessarily apply to determiners such as these; when dealing with changes in complex presuppositions,
at what point has semantic "bleaching" occurred?  It seems that, based on these criteria, the case for
grammaticalization is flimsy at best.
If one were to look at this change through a telescope, analyzing only the beginning and end of
the story, grammaticalization as a process may seem quite plausible.  One could hypothesize that only
the masculine form underwent grammaticalization, and the neuter form remained stagnant.  However,
as I have shown, this is not the case.  The meaning of the demonstrative became generalized without
regard  to grammatical  gender.   It  was after  the fact  that  the neuter  þæt was  reassigned to  a more
demonstrative-like position in the language.  This is one more piece of evidence that the processes by
which we achieve the result of grammaticalization are reversible.  In summary, the data support the
view  that  language  change  does  not  follow  any  cline,  and  that  the  development  of  a  mot  jadis
autonome into a grammatical form is the aggregate result of reversible processes of semantic change,
not a process itself.
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Conclusion
I have argued that the OE demonstrative, while not identical, is similar in usage to the MnE
demonstrative  in  that  it  acts  as  a  differentiating  device,  and  thus  necessarily  involves  a  kind  of
uniqueness presupposition, and that if we assume Roberts' informational uniqueness hypothesis, which
accounts for the overlap in function and distribution between the demonstrative and the definite article
by positing that the two forms share such a presupposition, it is possible to account for the development
of definiteness in English in terms of pragmatic inferencing.  Also I have argued that, although this
change seems to conform to the grammaticalization cline, the redeployment of the neuter form of the
demonstrative as a strong familiarity marker is evidence that semantic change is not unidirectional.
The approach I have taken engenders two methodological concerns, the first being the extent to
which it is productive to do semantic analysis on a language with no existing native speakers.  This is
surely an obstacle, especially in an analysis which depends so crucially on context, as texts generally
do not provide explicit information about what discourse referents exist in the common ground of the
author and his audience, yet the obstacle is not insurmountable.  It simply requires that assumptions be
made on the basis of what is known about the texts and the intended audiences thereof.  For example,
in order for the IIN to arise in NPs like þam wundrum þe he geworhte on life 'those miracles that he
performed in life', with he anaphoric to Christ, I must assume that it is in the common ground of Ælfric
and  his  intended  audience  that  Christ  performed  miracles  during  his  life.   This  is  a  reasonable
assumption  to  make,  as  the  text  is  a  sermon  intended  for  a  church  audience,  and  generally  such
audiences know the basic facts about the deity whom they worship.
Another concern is whether an approach based on the deep analysis of a small number of texts
should be preferred to a corpus-based approach.  The former imposes the risk that one may find false
significance in idiosyncratic aspects of the author's style, while the latter often provides insufficient
information from which to make inferences about the context.  When analyzing pragmatic phenomena,
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context is key,  and thus analyzing numbers from a corpus is not adquately informative.  (A corpus
does, however, confirm that the lack of uniqueness effects in OE is not unique to the texts which I have
examined; for example, of  100 sample occurrences  of the semantically unique noun  anginn in the
Dictionary of  Old English  Corpus,  only 3  were  accompanied  by some form of  se which was  not
obviously anaphoric.)  In spite of the difficulties of viewing semantics and pragmatics from a historical
perspective, I believe it is useful to incorporate the tools of formal linguistics into diachronic studies.  It
is  perhaps  impossible to make any bold formal  claims about  Old English;  however,  the tools can
eliminate the definitional uncertainties which often plague otherwise well-formed arguments. 
References
Abbott,  B.:  2004,  'Definiteness  and Indefiniteness',  in L.  Horn and G. Ward (eds.),  Handbook of  
Pragmatics, Blackwell Publishing.
Butcher, C.: 2006, God of Mercy: Ælfric's Sermons and Theology, Mercer University Press.
Chickering, H.: 1977, Beowulf: A Dual-language Edition, Anchor Books.
Christophersen, P.: 1939, The Articles: A Study of their Theory and Use in English, Oxford University 
Press. 
Clark, H.H.: 1975, 'Bridging',  Theoretical Issues in Natural Language Processing,  Association for  
Computational Linguistics.
Greenberg,  J.:  1978,  'How  Does  a  Language  Acquire  Gender  Markers?',  in  J.  Greenberg  (ed.),  
Universals of Human Language, Volume 3: Word Structure, Stanford University Press, pp. 49-
82.
Grice, H.P.: 1957, 'Meaning', Philosophical Review 66, 377-88.
Hawkins, J.A.: 1978, Definiteness and Indefiniteness, Croom Helm, London.
Heim, I.: 1982, The Semantics of Definite and Indefinite Noun Phrases, Ph.D. dissertation, University 
of Massachusetts, Amherst.
THE OLD ENGLISH DEMONSTRATIVE                                                                                                                                                   33
Heine, B. and T. Kuteva: 2002, World Lexicon of Grammaticalization, Cambridge University Press.
Hock, H.H.: 1991, Principles of Historical Linguistics, Mouton de Gruyter.
Hopper, P. and E. Traugott: 1993, Grammaticalization, Cambridge University Press.
Jones, C.: 1988, Grammatical Gender in English: 950 to 1250, Croom Helm, London.
Joseph, B.: 2003, 'Morphologization from Syntax', in The Handbook of Historical Linguistics, pp. 472-
492, Blackwell Publishing.
Kadmon, N.: 1990, 'Uniqueness', Linguistics and Philosophy 13, 273-324.
Karttunen,  L.:  1976,  'Discourse  Referents'  in  J.  McCawley  (ed.),  Notes  from  the  Linguistic  
Underground, Academic Press, New York.
Lass,  R.:  1990,  'How  to  do  Things  with  Junk:  Exaptation  in  Language  Evolution',  Journal  of  
Linguistics 26, 79-102.
Lyons, C.: 1999, Definiteness, Cambridge University Press.
Lyons, J.: 1977, Semantics, 2 vols., Cambridge University Press.
Meillet, A.: 1912, 'L'évolution des formes grammaticales', Scientia 12.
Mitchell, B.: 1985, Old English Syntax, 2 vols., Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Mitchell, B. and F. Robinson: 1982, A Guide to Old English, University of Toronto Press.
Pope, J.: 1967, Homilies of Ælfric, 2 vols., Oxford University Press.
Quirk, R. and C.L. Wrenn: 1955, An Old English Grammar, Routledge.
Roberts, C.: 2002, 'Demonstratives as Definites', in K. von Deemter and R. Kibble (eds.), Information 
Sharing, CSLI Publications, pp. 89-136.
Roberts, C.: 2003, 'Uniqueness in Definite Noun Phrases', Linguistics and Philosophy 26, 287-350.
Russell, B.: 1905, 'On Denoting', Mind 14, 479-93.
Strawson, P.F.: 1950, 'On Referring', Mind 59, 320-44.
Toller, T.N. (ed.): 1898, An Anglo-Saxon Dictionary, Based on the Manuscripts of Joseph Bosworth, 
THE OLD ENGLISH DEMONSTRATIVE                                                                                                                                                   34
Clarendon Press, Oxford
Traugott, E. and R. Dasher: 2005, Regularity in Semantic Change, Cambridge University Press.
